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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

the coal as well as in the coal itself, yet recognized as indisputable that upon
exhaustion of the coal the space would revert to the grantor. If, as contended,
the conveyance of the coal carries with it the containing chamber, why
should the ownership of the space terminate as soon as all the coal is mined?
The rational view would be that the reverter takes place because the grantee
has never at any time had a corporeal estate in the containing walls. The conveyance carries an estate in the coal only, with an easement in the walls for
support and removal. s In the exercise of that easement the grantee has no
right to put an additional burden upon the servient estate by using it for
mining of coal in adjoining tracts. The easement is incidental to the grant
of a fee in the coal, and exhaustion, or abandonment in fact, of the coal terminates the easement, and the space reverts to the grantor. 9 This appears to
be the most justifiable opinion, although, as pointed out, distinctly in the
minority. An application of this rule combined with a requirement that the
grantee of the coal be permitted to maintain his surface installations and use
them along with the underground haulways upon the payment of a reasonable
rental would appear to satisfy both the pecuniary interests of the parties and
the public interest in protecting a basic and vital industry.
NORBERT AUER

TORTS - INTERFERENCE WITH OR INJURIES IN PERSONAL RELATIONS MALICIOUS INDUCEMENT OF BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE. - Plaintiff
brought action against defendants, her fiance's brothers and sisters, alleging
that through the use of false, malicious, and slanderous statements, not specifically set forth in the complaint, they induced her fiance to break his engagement with her. The suit was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Cook
County, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was held, that the
judgment of the lower court dismissing the action should be affirmed. In
the absence of slanderous or libelous words, no cause of action will lie against
a third person for procuring a breach of a contract to marry, regardless of
malicious intent.' The mere allegation that slanderous statements were made,
without setting forth the nature of the statements, is a conclusion of law, and is
insufficient to state a cause of action for slander. Brown v. Glickstein, 107
N.E.2d 267 (I11.
1952).
The decision seems quite sound on the basis of public policy. Though it is
well-settled that third parties who wrongfully induce the breach of an ordinary civil contract will incur liability, the contract for marriage is a distinct
8.
9.

Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 283, 105 S.E. 117, 119 (1921).
Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 AtI. 597, 599 (1893).

1. 2 Cooley, Torts §176 42 (4th ed. 1932). "The prevention of a marriage by the
interference of a third person, cannot, in general, in itself, be a legal wrong. Thus if one,
by solicitations, or by the arts of ridicule or otherwise, shall induce one to break off an
existing contract of marriage, no action will lie for it, no matter how contemptible and
blamable may be the conduct. But a loss of marriage may be such a special injury as will
support an action of slander or libel, where the party was induced to break off the
engagement by false and damaging charges not actionable per se." Davis v. Gardiner,
4 Coke 16, 76 Eng. Rep. 897 (1693);. Nelson v. Staff, Cro. Jac. 422, 79 Eng. Rep. 360

(1617); Southold v. Daunston, Cro. Car. 269, 79 Eng. Rep. 834 (1632); Shepherd v.
Wakeman, 1 Sid. 80, 82 Eng. Rep. 982 (1662); Parkins v. Scott, 1 H. & C. 153, 158
Eng. Rep. 839 (1862).
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exception to the rule.2 The institution of marriage carries with it a unique
sanctity. Therefore, the state has such an interest in the security of the
marriage relationship, once assumed, that it is for the best interests of society
that engaged parties should have every opportunity to seek the advice and
counsel of relatives and friends.3 It has been said by one court that not only
would marriage itself be on less firm ground if advice were stifled by fear
of litigation, but to allow indiscriminate actions to be brought against anyone
who induced a breach of promise would be upon the door to a flood of
4
litigation by disappointed suitors against their more successful rivals.
This latter reasoning seems a bit fanciful, to say the least, and seems
to reason to an illogical extreme, disregarding the social realities. The
disappointed suitor does not make it a practice to seek solace before
the judicial tribunal unless he is more vindictive than most men. The reasoning of the courts that parents, or those standing in loco parentis, might
find themselves subject to litigation for giving their children or wards advice
on prospective marital alliances seems a somewhat sounder rationale for the
majority view. 5 The parental right to advise offspring on the advisability
of an impending marriage is generally recognized. 6 Some courts qualify
this right, saying that the parental advice must be rendered in good faith,
and do not condone defamatory remarks by the parent. 7, All courts, however,
even courts that would hold third parties. liable, recognize some advisory right,
either qualified, or unqualified, in the parent. Even evidence that the breach
was caused by seduction or conspiracy will not, as a rule, impose liability on
the defendant. 8
A Canadian decision goes considerably beyond the doctrine laid down in
the single American case which would hold third parties, not standing in the
relation of parents of the plaintiff, liable. It would hold any and all third
parties liable for causing a breach of the marriage promise.9 The Canadian
court apparently failed to differentiate between contracts for marriage and
ordinary civil contracts. Historically, it has been well-settled for a considerable time that there is liability for inducing the breach of an ordinary civil
2. Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 111. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898); Leonard v. Whetstone,
34 Ind. App. 383, 68 N.E. 197 (1903); Ryther v. Lefferts, 232 App. Div. 552, 250 N.Y.
Supp. 699 (1931).

102

3.

Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N.E. 491 (1929); Homan v. Hall,

Neb. 70, 165 N.W. 881 (1917); Clarahan v. Cosper, 160 Wash. 642, 296 Pac. 140
(1931).
4. Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N.W. 881, 882 (1917).
"The right of
engaged parties to ask the advice of their friends and the right of the friends to give
advice has never been denied. To hold that a third party may be subject to answer in
damages for advising or inducing an engaged person to break the engagement might result in a suit by every disappointed lover against his successful rival."
5. Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N.E. 491 (1929).
6. Minsky v. Saterstein, 6 N.J. Misc. 978, 143 At. 512 (1928). Here the court held
that parents are not liable for inducing breach, but may be liable in tort for defamatory
statements made in inducing it. The court further held that third parties are not in loco
parentis as to the engaged parties and are therefore liable for inducing a breach of
promise.

7. Nelson v. Melvin, 236 Iowa 604, 19 N.W. 2d 685 (1945); Lukas v. Tarpilaskas,
266 Mass. 374, 165 N.E. 513 (1929). The cases cited require a showing of libel or
slander before the parents can be held liable for the" malicous inducement of breach, much
as with third parties.
8. Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 144 N.W. 1089 (1914); Nelson v. Melvin,
supra, note 7; Leonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind App. 383, 68 N.E. 197 (1903).
9. Gunn v. Barr, I D.L.R. 855 (1926); Minsky v. Satenstein, 6 N.J. Misc. 978, 143
At. 512 (1928).
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contract. The English cases on this subject first recognized a remedy for
10
and later expanded this doctrine to
enticing a master to leave his servant,
i
include inducements for breaches of all contractual obligations." However,
even the early cases seemed to recognize a distinction between the ordinary
civil contract and the contract to marry. These cases conformed to the present majority of decisions in denying recovery on grounds of breach of promise,
2
but in granting it if slander or libel were alleged with proper particularity,'
proof of malice being necessary13 Liability in actions for inducement of the
breach of the marriage promise should be distinguished from liability for
inducing the dissolution of the marriage relation itself. The courts recognize
this as a definite wrong in and of itself, and consider the marriage union to
14
Even parents are
stand on the same footing as any other form of contract.
held liable in these cases unless it can be shown that the health and welfare
of one of the spouses was being endangered by the plaintiff."5 A similar prin6
ciple applies to friends and other relatives.'
Actions of the nature of the one in the instant case may soon become more
of academic rather than dynamic legal interest, howevere, since there is a
basic inconsistency in such cases. Actions for breach of promise even between the two primarily interested parties have been abolished in fifteen
jurisdictions to date, and there seems to be a general trend in this direction.',
The reasoning of the states which have abolished these actions seems to be
that the promise to marry is of such a nebulous nature as not to lend itself
readily to the realm of contracts. Thus, it can be seen that in the light of the
present trend, debate on questions of liability for inducing breach of promise
may soon become irrevelant. The courts perhaps recognize this by implication
when they insist that actions of this nature must be based upon libel or slander
rather than on breach of promise.
DOUGLAS BIRDZELL
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SLANDER PER SE -

COMMUNIST NOT
CHARGE OF BEING
AND SLANDER During the course of an argument in public defendant

said to plaintiff, "You are a Communist." "The whole neighborhood knows
that you and your husband are Communists." "Some investigator came to my
house recently and I gave him the whole story about your being Communists."
10.

11.

Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).

Temperton v. Russel, 1 Q.B. 715 (1893).

12. Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Coke 16, 76 Eng. Rep. 897 (1693); Nelson v. Staff, Cro.
Jac. 422, 79 Eng. Rep. 360 (1617); Southold v. Daunston, Cro. Car. 269, 79 Eng. Rep.
834 (1632); Shepherd v. Wakeman, 1 Sid. 80, 82 Eng. Rep. 982 (1662); Parkins v.

Scott, 1 H.&C. 153, 158 Eng. Rep. 839 (1862).
13.

Harriot v. Plimpton, 166 Mass. 585, 44 N.E. 992 (1896); Jacobs v. Schweinert,

114 N.J.Eq. 748, 168 Atl. 741 (1933); Nelson v. Melvin, 236 Iowa 604, 19 N.W.2d 685
(1945).
14. Sullivan v. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170, 180 Pac. 91 (1919); Plourd v. Jarvis,
99 Me. 161, 58 Atl. 774 (1904). These cases held that an action for alienation of' affections would lie against third parties if their wrongful conduct was the proximate and
procuring cause of the dissolution of the marriage.

15. Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 60 N.W. 202 (1894); Wallace v. Wallace, 85
Mont. 492, 279 Pac. 374 (1929); Hodginson v. Hodginson, 43 Neb. 269, 61 N.W. 577
(1895); Oakman v. Belden, 94 Me. 280, 47 Atl. 553 (1900).
16. Sullivan V. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170, 180 Pac. 91 (1919); Plourd v. Jarvis,
99 Me. 161, 58 Atl. 774 (1904).
17. Harper, Problems of the Family, 168, 1951.

